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Background: North American patients are experiencing difficulties in securing affiliations with family physicians.
Centralized waiting lists are increasingly being used in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
countries to improve access. In 2011, the Canadian province of Quebec introduced new financial incentives for
family physicians’ enrolment of orphan patients through centralized waiting lists, the Guichet d’accès aux clientèles
orphelines, with higher payments for vulnerable patients. This study analyzed whether any significant changes were
observed in the numbers of patient enrolments with family physicians’ after the introduction of the new financial
incentives. Prior to then, financial incentives had been offered for enrolment of vulnerable patients only and there were
no incentives for enrolling non-vulnerable patients. After 2011, financial incentives were also offered for enrolment of
non-vulnerable patients, while those for enrolment of vulnerable patients were doubled.
Methods: A longitudinal quantitative analysis spanning a five-year period (2008–2013) was performed using
administrative databases covering all patients enrolled with family physicians through centralized waiting lists in
the province of Quebec (n = 494,697 patients). Mixed regression models for repeated-measures were used.
Results: The number of patients enrolled with a family physician through centralized waiting lists more than
quadrupled after the changes in financial incentives. Most of this increase involved non-vulnerable patients. After
the changes, 70% of patients enrolled with a family physician through centralized waiting lists were non-vulnerable
patients, most of whom had been referred to the centralized waiting lists by the physician who enrolled them, without
first being registered in those lists or having to wait because of their priority level.
Conclusion: Centralized waiting lists linked to financial incentives increased the number of family physicians’ patient
enrolments. However, although vulnerable patients were supposed to be given precedence, physicians favoured
enrolment of healthier patients over those with greater health needs and higher assessed priority. These results
suggest that introducing financial incentives without appropriate regulations may lead to opportunistic use of the
incentive system with unintended policy consequences.
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Effective health systems rely on well-organized and ac-
cessible primary healthcare [1,2]. The Pan American
Health Organization has suggested renewing primary
healthcare in the Americas based on a core set of func-
tional and structural elements that guarantee access to
services [3]. Over the past decade, several industrial* Correspondence: mylaine.breton@usherbrooke.ca
1Charles-LeMoyne Hospital Research Centre, Longueuil Campus, 150 Place
Charles-LeMoyne, Room 200, Longueuil J4L 0A8, Quebec, Canada
2Université de Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2015 Breton et al.; licensee BioMed Central.
Commons Attribution License (http://creativec
reproduction in any medium, provided the or
Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.or
unless otherwise stated.countries, including Canada, have recommended re-
inforcing primary care services to guarantee every citi-
zen access to a family physician [4-9]. Despite those
recommendations, North American patients are experi-
encing greater difficulties in securing affiliation with a
regular family physician compared to those in other
OECD countries [10].
To address these difficulties in accessing continuous
primary care services, particularly for more vulnerable
clienteles, four Canadian provinces have created central-
ized waiting lists to improve access to family physicians:This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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Brunswick, A GP for Me in British Columbia, and the
Guichet d’accès aux clientèles orphelines (GACO) in
Quebec. These waiting lists centralize requests for family
physicians in a given territory and match unattached pa-
tients with family physicians based on a priority scale
and on the availability of primary care resources [11].
In these four provinces, patient enrolment through cen-
tralized waiting lists is associated with financial incentives
for family physicians [12]. Several other health policies
also use financial incentives to encourage physician buy-in
[13-15]. One of the best-known models is pay-for-
performance, which uses financial incentives to reward
professionals who meet quality standards [16]. The great-
est challenge in using financial incentives is to carefully
define and effectively align the modalities with the tar-
geted objectives to avoid unintended consequences, such
as over- or under-utilization of services [17].
Objective
The objective of this study was to analyze whether there
were any significant changes in patient enrolments with
family physicians through GACOs in Quebec after the
introduction of new financial incentives. The numbers of
patients were analyzed according to various patient char-
acteristics, such as vulnerability criteria, assessed priority
level, and source of registration in the GACO. We ana-
lyzed data at the provincial level over a five-year period
(2008–2013), before and after the introduction of new fi-
nancial incentives in November 2011. The centralized
waiting lists (GACOs) implemented in 2008 for patients
without family physicians had two objectives: 1) to in-
crease the number of persons with a family physician,
and 2) to give priority to vulnerable patients. Financial
incentives were provided from the outset in 2008, which
were then modified in November 2011. The results of
our study allowed us to analyze the changes in family
physicians’ enrolment of orphan or unattached patients
(i.e., those without a family physician) and to determine
whether vulnerable patients were given prioritized access
to a family physician.
Methods
Setting
Quebec is a province of over eight million residents with
a tax-based system providing universal insurance cover-
age for medical services. In this system, physicians are
remunerated predominantly on a fee-for-service basis,
with those fees also covering operating costs. Private
practices are operated by family physicians, who are self-
employed. There are also government-operated medical
clinics, called local community health centres, where
family physicians are paid on a salary basis, but less than
20% of family physicians work in such centres. Newmodels of primary care, such as Family Medicine Groups
(FMGs) and Network Clinics, were put in place in the
early 2000s. These new models, intended to improve
healthcare organization and delivery, are based on con-
tractual agreements with the government [18]. FMGs
are groups of physicians working in close collaboration
with nurses to provide services to registered patients.
The government pays for the recruitment of nurses and
administrative staff and the acquisition of computer
equipment [19]. As of January 2014, there were over 250
accredited FMGs in Quebec, in which more than 40% of
the province’s residents were enrolled.
Formal enrolment of patients with physicians is rela-
tively new, and patient enrolment payments represent
only a marginal proportion of physicians’ income in Que-
bec. Enrolment payments were instituted in the early
2000s with the introduction of FMGs. At that time, only
family physicians practising in FMGs received an annual
bonus for enrolling non-vulnerable patients. It was only
recently, in 2009, that payments for enrolment of non-
vulnerable patients were extended to all other family phy-
sicians (i.e., those not in FMGs). These payments are
modulated based on clientele characteristics and the
model of primary care. They constitute the beginnings
of a capitation model, but without penalties or any re-
quirements for physicians to see their patients, or for
their patients to consult them, in order to receive pay-
ment. These annual payments are approximately $10
per non-vulnerable patient and $55 per vulnerable pa-
tient, plus a per-visit surcharge for the vulnerable pa-
tients [20].
The policy intervention: centralized waiting lists for
orphan patients
Quebec has the highest rate (28%) in Canada of persons
reporting not having a family physician [21]. In response
to this substantial need to connect orphan patients with
family physicians, the Ministry of Health and Social Ser-
vices (MSSS) and the Quebec Federation of General
Practitioners (FMOQ) jointly decided, in 2008, to imple-
ment 93 centralized waiting lists for unattached patients,
the Guichets d’accès aux clientèles orphelines (GACO).
These GACOs are managed by the Health and Social
Services Centres, which are responsible for the popula-
tion in their territory. The objective of these GACOs is
to facilitate access for the territory’s residents to a family
physician, based on both a clinical priority scale and
medical manpower availability. Each GACO is run by a
nurse and an administrative assistant, in collaboration
with a local medical coordinator.
When patients are registered in a GACO, they are
assigned a priority code. This code is determined by a
nurse in collaboration with the local medical coordinator
based on the urgency and complexity of the case. This
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status requires urgent management can be enrolled with
a family physician more rapidly. Standards regarding
length of wait times for enrolment with a family phys-
ician according to priority codes are set by the MSSS
and the FMOQ. Priority 1 indicates that the nurse has
assessed the patient’s health status as requiring immedi-
ate medical management. Such would be the case, for
example, of someone presenting complex pathologies or
health status destabilization. For this patient category,
the MSSS and FMOQ recommend referral to a family
physician within 30 days. Patients identified as Priority 2
require medical management within the short term (less
than three months), and those assessed as Priority 3
need to be seen within the medium term (less than six
months). Priority 4 patients are considered non-urgent,
but should be seen within a year. Priority 5 patients are
in good health, with no known health problems; there is
no recommended time frame for their referral to a fam-
ily physician.
Patients are enrolled with a family physician through a
process that respects medical manpower availability, the
practice locations of physicians registered with GACOs,
as well as the established priorities. The information re-
garding patients’ health status is documented and sent
to the physicians. From the GACOs’ creation until No-
vember 2011, physicians received a payment of $103 for
each patient designated as vulnerable who was enrolled
through a GACO, but no payment for non-vulnerable
patients. The amount was paid in two instalments: the
first at the patient’s first medical visit, and the second
when the patient was seen by the physician during the
following year. Patients were considered vulnerable if
they presented with one of 19 codes of vulnerability as
defined by Quebec’s Health Insurance Board, the Régie
de l’Assurance-maladie du Québec (RAMQ), based on
the presence of certain medical diagnoses (e.g. diabetes,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, mental health
disorders).
Change in financial incentives
In November 2011, the amount of these bonus payments
was modified, and a new payment was introduced to fur-
ther encourage family physicians to participate in GACOs
and to increase the population’s access to family physi-
cians. From then on, for enrolments processed through
GACOs, family physicians received $100 for non-
vulnerable patients and $208 for vulnerable patients.
These payments are bonuses paid upon the patient’s
first visit to the family physician. The government’s in-
tent was to increase the number of patients enrolled
with a family physician and to encourage enrolment of
patients considered vulnerable. Family physicians’ par-
ticipation in GACOs is voluntary.Study design: a before–after study of financial incentive
changes
In this paper we report on the results of a before–after
analysis of data from a provincial database of centralized
waiting lists to determine whether changes could be ob-
served in patients’ enrolment with family physicians after
the financial incentives were modified. We analyzed the
effect of that change (before–after) on the number of pa-
tients enrolled through centralized waiting lists. We ana-
lyzed data from a provincial administrative database used
by professionals working in GACOs which tracks the
number of patients registered and waiting as well as the
number of patients enrolled with family physicians
through GACOs. Within the database, we examined a
five-year period (April 1, 2008, to March 31, 2013).
Participants
Cohort study: all patients enrolled with a family physician
through GACOs
The provincial database includes the 494,697 patients en-
rolled with family physicians through 87 GACOs across
the province over the five-year period under study. This
database excludes one region with six GACOS using
another database. The study was approved by the
Sherbrooke Hospital Research Ethics Board (ref. num-
ber CHUS14-091).
Variables and statistical analysis performed
We compared the number of patients enrolled with a
family physician through GACOs before and after the
changes in financial incentives were introduced in
November 2011. The numbers of patients enrolled
before and after were compared on three patient charac-
teristics: presence of a vulnerability code, the source of
referral for GACO registration, and the assigned priority
code. The level of analysis was the number of patients
compared for 65 periods of time corresponding to 25
working days each. Mixed regression models for
repeated-measures were used to compare the numbers
of patients enrolled with a family physician through
GACOs before (time periods 1-47) and after the change
(time periods 48-65), based on the three characteristics
of interest. We used three general linear mixed models,
which are parametric linear models appropriate for non-
independent data, with SAS 9.3 software, regressing the
number of enrolled patients on indicators of vulnerabil-
ity, source of referral for GACO registration, and priority
code. There were no control variables.
Results
Table 1 presents the details of the three mixed regression
models for repeated-measures for the patient characteris-
tics analyzed (vulnerability, source of referral for GACO
registration, and priority code). For each characteristic,
Table 1 Numbers of patients enrolled with a family physician through GACOs before and after the changes in financial
incentives by vulnerability, by source of registration in GACOs, and by priority code
Before (Periods 1 to 47)
N = 47




All Total 107 100 387 597
<.0001Average per period 1 139 10 767
CI 555 ; 1 724 8517 ; 10 738
Patients with vulnerability
Yes: patients had a least one vulnerability code* Total 74 017 116 119
<.0001Average per period 1 575 6 451
CI 1 086 ; 2 064 5 661 ; 7 241
No Total 33 083 271 478
<.0001Average per period 704 15 082
CI 215 ; 1 193 14 292 ; 15 872
Source of referrals for GACO registration (The main categories are presented)
Hospitalization and ER Total 3 283 3 449
0.58Average per period 70 192
CI -159 ; 299 -178 ; 561
Health professionals Total 43 706 48 057
0.0002Average per period 131 343
CI 72 ; 190 248 ; 439
Self-referral Total 13 314 24 8039
<.0001Average per period 289 13 780
CI 128 ; 451 13 518 ; 14 041
User Total 33 466 71 359
<.0001Average per period 824 3 964
CI 662 ; 986 3 704 ; 4 226
Priority codes
Priority 1: less than 30 days Total 11 224 11 032
<.0001Average per period 239 613
CI 10 ; 467 244 ; 982
Priority 2: less than 3 months Total 31 378 78 341
<.0001Average per period 668 4 352
CI 440 ; 896 3 983 ; 4 721
Priority 3: less than six months Total 40 303 89 243
<.0001Average per period 858 4 958
CI 629 ; 1 086 4 589 ; 5 327
Priority 4: less than one year Total 8 750 38 531
<.0001Average per period 186 2 141
CI 42 ; 415 1 772 ; 2 510
Priority 5: no time frame recommended Total 15 445 170 450
<.0001Average per period 329 9 469
CI 100 ; 557 9 100 ; 9 838
*Patients were considered vulnerable if they presented with one of 19 codes of vulnerability as defined by Quebec's Health Insurance Board (RAMQ) based on the
presence of certain medical diagnoses (e.g. diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, mental health disorders).
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before and after the change were compared using linear
regression. The p-value represents the significance of the
before–after difference for this group, with alpha = 0.05.
Change in volumes of patients enrolled with family
physicians through GACOs
Figure 1 presents the number of patients enrolled with
family physicians through GACOs over the five years
under study, divided into 65 administrative periods of 25
working days each. The figure shows two phases: before
and after the financial incentives were changed.
Over these five years, across the province of Quebec,
494,119 patients were enrolled with a family physician
through GACOs. As seen in Figure 1, the number ofFigure 1 Numbers of non-vulnerable patients and vulnerable patientpatients enrolled increased substantially over time, espe-
cially after the introduction, in November 2011 (period
47), of the new financial incentive for enrolling patients
considered non-vulnerable. This was when the govern-
ment doubled the incentive for enrolling vulnerable pa-
tients (from $103 to $208) and added a $100 incentive for
enrolling non-vulnerable patients. After the 47th period,
we observe a substantial increase in the number of non-
vulnerable patient enrolments (p <0.001), whereas the
number of vulnerable patients enrolled through GACOs
increased only slightly (p <0.001). The temporary reduc-
tions observed in the total volume of patients enrolled
through GACOs correspond to summer months and end-
of-year holiday seasons. The increases in both vulnerable
and non-vulnerable patients were significant, but thes enrolled with family physicians through GACOs.
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vulnerable patients. As presented in Table 1, before the
change, the mean number of patients without a vulner-
ability code enrolled per period with family physicians was
703; this increased to a mean of 15,082 patients per period
after the change.
Although, the absolute number of vulnerable patients
enrolled slightly increased after the changes to financial
incentives in November 2011, a significant decrease in
the proportion of enrolled patients who were vulner-
able was observed with a corresponding significant in-
crease in the proportion of enrolled patients who were
non-vulnerable. Before the new incentive to enrol non-
vulnerable patients was introduced, nearly 70% of patients
enrolled through GACOs were vulnerable patients; after-
ward, the proportion of enrolments of vulnerable patients
dropped to 30%.Figure 2 Numbers of patients enrolled with family physicians througChange in the source of referrals for GACO registrations
Referrals may be made to the GACO from different
sources. Patients may put themselves on the list, either
by telephoning, mailing in a form, or registering online.
Patients may also be referred by a health professional
following a clinic consultation, an ER visit, a hospitalization,
or in another care context. When a referral for GACO
registration comes from a family physician who is referring
the patient to himself, this source is considered to be a self-
referral by the family physician.
Figure 2 shows the increased use of physician self-
referrals (dotted-line curve). Whereas less than 15% of
patients came from physician self-referrals before the in-
centives were changed, that proportion rose to 70% on
average. Table 1 shows that, before the change, a mean
of 289 patients per period came from self-referrals, in-
creasing to 13,780 afterward—an increase of 48 times.h GACOs, by source of referrals for GACO registration.
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zations and emergency rooms was low before the
change, with a mean of 69 patients per period, and did
not increase significantly afterward (p = 0.58), rising only
to a mean of 191 patients per period.Change in the priority codes of patients enrolled with
family physicians through GACOs
As mentioned earlier, when patients are registered with
a GACO, they are assigned a priority code (P1 to P5)
based on a clinical assessment, with the highest priority
being P1. It should be recalled that the amount of the fi-
nancial incentive paid to physicians is based on whether
or not the patient is designated as vulnerable; the incen-
tive does not, however, take into account the assigned
priority code.Figure 3 Numbers of patients enrolled with family physicians througThe results revealed a major change in the distribution
of patients enrolled with a family physician through
GACOs in terms of assigned priorities. The most strik-
ing change is the significant increase in the proportion
of patients designated as priority 5, that is, patients con-
sidered to be in good health and not in need of immedi-
ate care. This clientele is illustrated in Figure 3 by the
curve with stars. In effect, the results show that nearly
45% of the patients enrolled with family physicians
through GACOs during the last year were patients
assessed as being in good health, whose health status did
not require even non-urgent care. Before the change, a
mean of 328 patients enrolled per period were priority 5
compared to a mean of 9,469 patients per period after
the change (p <0.001). Meanwhile, the number of pa-
tients designated as priority 1 changed only slightly over
this time; these were the patients whose health statush GACOs, by assigned priority codes.
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ily physician. Before the change, a mean of 238 priority
1 patients were enrolled per period with a family phys-
ician through GACOs, while after it, that mean number
increased only to 612 (p <0.09).
Discussion
Key results
Our results paint a mixed portrait of how well the GACOs’
objectives have been met through the use of financial in-
centives. These observations are important for structuring
other experiences of centralized waiting lists.
Interpretation
Did GACOs help increase the enrolment of real orphan
patients?
GACOs were originally set up with the objective of in-
creasing enrolments of orphan patients while giving pri-
ority of access to vulnerable patients. In the first phase
of the GACOs’ existence, the volume of patients enrolled
through this mechanism was low. GACOs were intro-
duced in 2008, and it took at least two years before they
were implemented all across the province, which ex-
plains the small number of patients enrolled with a family
physician through that mechanism during that period.
Our results showed a slight increase in the number of pa-
tients over the period prior to the change in financial in-
centives. However, as can be seen in the graphs presented,
after the financial incentives were changed, the number of
patients enrolled with family physicians through GACOs
more than doubled in one year. In 2011–2012, 140,434
patients were enrolled with family physicians through
GACOs. That number increased to 291,676 in 2012–2013,
after the change in incentives. However, after November
2011, patients enrolled with family physicians through
GACOs were mainly non-vulnerable and non-priority pa-
tients coming through physician self-referrals.
According to the MSSS’s database, in 2011–2012 and
2012–2013, 4,821,216 persons and 5,030,019 persons, re-
spectively, were enrolled with a family physician, out of
a total population of 8 million. Changes in the overall
number of patients enrolled with family physicians in
the population reflect the fact that every year new pa-
tients are enrolled, some patients die or relocate, and
some family physicians retire. Between 2011–2012 and
2012–2013, the number of patients enrolled with a fam-
ily physician in the population increased by 208,803, and
over that period 291,676 patients were enrolled with a
family physician through the GACO mechanism. This
unexpected result suggests that the majority of the new
patients enrolled with a family physician during this
period came from GACOs.
Another phenomenon observed was the registration in
GACOs of many patients of retiring family physicians.Prior to the existence of GACOs, when family physicians
retired, their patients were informally transferred to
other physicians. The GACOs thus created a more for-
mal and costly transfer of patients within the healthcare
system. For patients who are “orphaned” after the retire-
ment of their family physician, GACOs might be helpful.
However, mechanisms should be developed to help such
patients, particularly the most vulnerable ones.
Usually, family physicians enrol new patients each year
in the course of natural patient turnover due to death,
relocation, or other life events. In a way, GACOs reward
family physicians for a task they were already doing: tak-
ing on new patients. The idea behind GACOs was to
help orphan patients, based on a priority assessment.
This raises new questions: What proportion of patients
enrolled through GACOs were actually patients who did
not already have a family physician, that is, were real or-
phan patients? Having a family physician and being for-
mally enrolled with a family physician are different. The
GACO system encourages the enrolment of patients.
However, patients may declare themselves as having a
family physician without having signed any formal enrol-
ment agreement. The GACO system may have provided
an opportunity to formally enrol patients who were
already being followed without formal enrolment. Does
the GACO system remunerate physicians for seeing pa-
tients they would have seen anyway? This raises import-
ant efficiency issues. We are not able to link those
patients with the data we used. However, it will eventu-
ally be possible to analyze whether patients enrolled
through GACOs had already received medical services
from that family physician prior becoming enrolled by
analyzing the RAMQ’s medical care insurance billing
data. This kind of analysis will be an important contribu-
tion to the analysis of the GACO policy’s impact.
What explains the non-enrolment of vulnerable patients?
Even when the payment to family physicians for taking
vulnerable patients doubled and was more than twice
the amount for non-vulnerable patients, family physi-
cians showed a preference for enrolling non-vulnerable
rather than vulnerable patients. This may reflect the fact
that non-vulnerable patients are more prevalent in the
pool of patients waiting in the GACOs. So, while the ob-
jective of increasing enrolments with family physicians
was achieved by changing the incentive system, that of
giving priority to vulnerable patients was not. The
intention had been to enrol vulnerable patients first,
ahead of patients with no known health problems (non-
vulnerable patients) who do not need frequent attention.
After the new financial incentives were introduced, there
was a substantial increase in the enrolment of non-
priority patients, but the volume of patients considered
vulnerable and of higher priority did not increase at the
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objectives—increasing the number of patients and pri-
oritizing vulnerable patients—appeared to be incompat-
ible, or at least not achievable through the same means.
Our results suggest that physicians tend to prefer receiv-
ing a lower amount per patient while enrolling more pa-
tients who are less demanding and probably require
shorter medical consultations, over receiving a higher
amount for vulnerable patients who require more care.
This observation is in line with results from other studies
[22,23]. As such, patients who are unwell will have a
harder time finding family physicians, leading to prob-
lems of equity in access to care. According to several
stakeholders and physicians we encountered, some cli-
enteles, such as those with mental health problems and
drug addictions, waited longer in GACOs before being
matched with a family physician, and those delays in-
creased after the new financial incentives were imple-
mented. Also, newspapers have reported cases of
discrimination against certain vulnerable clienteles such
as the elderly and persons with mental health problems
and drug addictions [24,25]. Is this because physicians
want to minimize the time spent in consultations in a
fee-for-service system? Or is it for other reasons, such
as their own perceived lack of expertise for treating pa-
tients with complex health conditions?
What are the next policy options for optimizing the
functioning of GACOs?
Enrolment of vulnerable patients only In the current
context, is it really advisable to set as an objective the
enrolment of the entire population, when vulnerable pa-
tients have a greater need? As noted earlier, of Quebec
residents without a family physician, nearly one-third
said they did not need one. While the benefits of having
a family physician are numerous for vulnerable clienteles
[26-28], for others, such as those who are young and in
good health, sustained contact with a physician has little
measurable impact on their already good health status
[29]. Currently, approximately 376,000 persons across
the province are registered in GACOs and waiting to be
enrolled with a family physician. That represents almost
11.87% of the 3,167,148 persons who are not enrolled
with a family physician. Note that some patients do not
want a family physician, others declare having a family
physician but are not formally enrolled with them, and
yet others are trying to find a family physician without
registering in GACOs. About 25% of the patients regis-
tered in the GACOs and waiting to be enrolled with a
family physician have been assessed by a health profes-
sional and identified as having at least one vulnerable
condition. These patients are the ones who need to be
followed regularly to ensure good management of their
illness and close monitoring of their health status [30]. Itwould therefore seem appropriate to focus more on en-
rolling vulnerable populations.
Self-referral mechanism The self-referral mechanism
allows physicians to select the patients they will enrol
through the GACOs instead of being linked with pa-
tients they have never seen. This practice of self-referral
appears to short-circuit the objective for which the
GACO system was created, which was to centralize pa-
tients’ requests on a shared list and to set access prior-
ities based on the urgency and complexity of cases as
assessed by health professionals. In Ontario, the neigh-
bouring province, centralized waiting lists do not accept
physician self-referrals [31]. In fact, in reaction to sub-
stantial cost increases related to GACOs, and the fact
that almost 70% of new enrolments now come through
self-referrals, in June 2013 the Quebec government put
new rules in place. Physician self-referrals are now pro-
hibited. Family physicians are limited to 150 patients en-
rolled through GACOs per year, and larger financial
incentives ($250) are offered for enrolling “super vulner-
able patients” (defined as having complex problems such
as mental illness and substance use problems). It will be
interesting to analyze the impact of these new rules and
financial incentives on the numbers of patients enrolled
through GACOs in the coming years.
Generalizability
Incentives in the context of payments and care
organization
Incentives should also be analyzed within their implemen-
tation context [32]. Financial incentives are often used for
instrumental purposes in a rational world of personal
interest [16]. Our results showed, however, that income
maximization did not appear to be the only driver for phy-
sicians’ behaviours and suggested the need for a serious
and thorough process of reflection to understand why
physicians are reluctant to enrol vulnerable patients.
Furthermore, in Quebec, payments to physicians par-
ticipating in GACOs occur in a context where fee-for-
service remuneration is predominant and remuneration
by capitated payment is relatively uncommon. Several
studies have suggested that a mixed remuneration model
combining fee-for-service and more generous capitated
payments might be a more promising solution [22] for
the management of complex clienteles.
Our study analyzed the case of GACOs in Quebec, but
our results are quite illustrative of the reactivity of physi-
cians’ practice to financial incentives. Using a longitudinal
study design based on a provincial dataset covering a five-
year period, our analysis enabled us to draw some import-
ant conclusions regarding physician behaviours. As such,
we believe our results can be used to inform the design of
centralized waiting lists in other healthcare contexts.
Breton et al. BMC Family Practice  (2015) 16:10 Page 10 of 11Limitations
The data were analyzed at the provincial level, and we
did not have access to certain descriptive variables of the
cohort as the sex, age, and patient location (urban vs. re-
gional). All GACOs across the province were analyzed
together, thereby limiting our capacity to analyze varia-
tions among GACOs. Some GACOs are being used to
reassign the patients of retiring physicians. Some only
take patients deemed vulnerable and identified as a high
priority; others register all patients, regardless of health
status. We were unable to perform multivariate regres-
sion analysis on these factors because our database did
not collect such detailed information. This is a limitation
of our study. However, the patient profiles are based on
a standard definition of vulnerability (presence of at least
one vulnerability code based on a list of 19 diagnoses). It
will be interesting to do further analyses on various cli-
enteles, such as patients with mental health problems,
and to analyze differences in relation to numbers of vul-
nerability codes. That information is present in the local
databases of GACOs but not aggregated at the provincial
level. Also, because we analyzed the longitudinal data-
base at the provincial level, variations in physician de-
mand and capacity across different regions of the
province could not be included in the analysis.Conclusion
This study showed that a change in financial incentives
slightly increased the number of vulnerable patients be-
ing enrolled with family physicians and largely in-
creased the number of non-vulnerable patients being
enrolled with family physicians. The GACO experience
demonstrates the need to monitor the effects of these
incentives very closely and to react promptly to align
them more closely with the objectives targeted. This ex-
perience also reveals the limitations of financial incentives
in orienting medical practice. It would be important to an-
ticipate the effects while considering the whole context of
payments and care organization and to explore other
medical practice organizational models that would foster
more equitable management of the population’s health.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
MB conceived the study, participated in its design and drafted the
manuscript. ABrousselle, ABoivin, DR, and RP participated in the
conceptualization of the study and helped to revise the manuscript. DB
realized the statistical analysis. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Acknowledgements
This study was funded by the Fonds de Recherche du Québec - Santé (FRQS)
and the Agence de la santé et des services sociaux de la Montérégie. AB is
funded by a CIHR clinician-scientist award.Author details
1Charles-LeMoyne Hospital Research Centre, Longueuil Campus, 150 Place
Charles-LeMoyne, Room 200, Longueuil J4L 0A8, Quebec, Canada. 2Université
de Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada. 3University of Montreal,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada. 4University of Montreal Hospital Research Centre,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Received: 22 September 2014 Accepted: 30 December 2014References
1. Starfield B, Shi L, Machinki J. Contribution of primary care to health systems
and health. Milbank Q. 2005;83:457–502.
2. Kringos DS, Boerma W, van der Zee J, Groenewegen P. Europe’s strong
primary care systems are linked to better population health but also to
higher health spending. Health Aff. 2013;32(4):686–94.
3. Pan American Health Organization. Renewing Primary Health Care in the
Americas: A Position Paper of the Pan American Health Organization/World
Health Organization (PAHO/WHO). Washingtion, D.C.: PAHO HQ Library
Cataloguing–in–Publication; 2007.
4. Romanow RJ. Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada. Final
Report. Ottawa: Government of Canada, Commission on the Future of
Health Care in Canada; 2002.
5. Clair M. Les solutions émergentes: Rapport et recommandations. Québec:
Gouvernement de Québec, Commission d’étude sur les services de santé et
les services sociaux; 2000.
6. Mazankowski D. A Framework for Reform: Report of the Premier’s Advisory
Council on Health. Edmonton: Government of Alberta, Premier’s Advisory
Council on Health for Alberta; 2011.
7. Sinclair D. Looking Back, Looking Forward: The Ontario Health Services
Restructuring Commission (1996-2000). A Legacy Report. Toronto: Ontario
Health Services Restructuring Commission; 2000.
8. Fyke KJ. Caring for Medicare: Sustaining a Quality System. Regina:
Government of Saskatchewan, Commission on Medicare; 2001.
9. Kirby MJL, LeBreton M. The Health of Canadians - The Federal Role. Final
Report. Volume 6: Recommendations for Reform. Ottawa: Standing Senate
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology; 2002.
10. Schoen C, Osborn R, Squires D, Doty M. Access, affordability, and insurance
complexity are often worse in the United States compared to 10 other
countries. Health Affairs Web. 2013;32(2):2205–15.
11. Breton M, Ricard J, Walter N. Connecting orphan patients with family
physicians: differences among Quebec’s access registries. Can Fam
Physician. 2012;58(9):921–2.
12. Breton M, Gagne J, Gankpé F. Implementing centralized waiting lists for
patients without a family physician in Quebec. Health Reform Observer.
2014;2(1):1–12.
13. Sutherland JM, Repin N, Trafford CR. Reviewing the Potential Roles of
Financial Incentives for Funding Healthcare in Canada. Ottawa: Canadian
Foundation for Healthcare Improvement; 2012.
14. Burns LR, Muller RW. Hospital-physician collaboration: landscape of
economic integration and impact on clinical integration. Milbank Q.
2008;86(3):375–434.
15. Marshall M, Harrison S. It’s about more than money: financial incentives and
internal motivation. Qual Saf Health Care. 2005;14:4–5.
16. Alshamsan R, Majeed A, Ashworth M, Car J, Millett C. Impact of pay for
performance on inequalities in health care: systematic review. J Health Serv
Res Policy. 2010;15(3):178–84.
17. Biller-Andorno N, Lee TH. Ethical physician incentives – from carrots and
sticks to shared purpose. N Engl J Med. 2013;368(11):980–2.
18. Pomey M-P, Martin E, Forest P-G. Quebec’s family medicine groups:
innovation and compromise in the reform of front-line care. Canadian
Political Science Review. 2009;3:31–46.
19. Breton M, Lévesque J-F, Pineault R, Hogg W. Primary care reform: can
Quebec’s Family Medicine Group model benefit from the experience of
Ontario’s Family Health Teams? Healthc Policy. 2011;7(2):E122–35.
20. Régie de l'assurance maladie du Québec. [Press Release] Services de
médecine de famille de prise en charge et de suivi de la clientèle. Québec;
2008.
21. Commissaire à la santé et au bien-être. L'expérience de soins des personnes
présentant les plus grands besoins de santé : le Québec comparé - Résultats
Breton et al. BMC Family Practice  (2015) 16:10 Page 11 of 11de l'enquête internationale sur les politiques de santé du Commonwealth
Fund. Québec: Le Commissaire à la santé et au bien-être; 2011.
22. Glazier R, Redelmeier D. Building the patient-centered medical home in
Ontario. JAMA. 2010;303(21):2186–7.
23. Léger PT. Physician Payment Mechanisms: Overview and Options for
Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Health Services Research Foundation; 2011. p. 15.
24. Georges P. Liste d’attente: des patients écartés de façon arbitraire. Sun
Media. Montreal: Le Journal de Montréal; 2013.
25. Portereau B. Les orphelins de la bureaucratie. L’Itineraire: Quebecor Media.
Montreal; 2013.
26. Fortin M, Bravo G, Hudon C, Vanasse A, Lapointe L. Prevalence of
multimorbidity among adults seen in family practice. Ann Fam Med.
2005;3(3):223–8.
27. Lambrew JM, DeFriese GH, Carey TS, Ricketts TC, Biddle AK. The effects of
having a regular doctor on access to primary care. Med Care.
1996;34(2):138–51.
28. McIsaac WJ, Fuller-Thomson E, Talbot Y. Does having regular care by a
family physician improve preventive care? Can Fam Physician. 2001;47:70–6.
29. Cheraghi-Sohi S, Hole AR, Mead N, McDonald R, Whalley D, Bower P, et al.
What patients want from primary care consultations: a discrete choice
experiment to identify patients’ priorities. Ann Fam Med. 2008;6(2):107–15.
30. Glazier RH, Klein-Geltink J, Kopp A, Sibley LM. Capitation and enhanced fee-
for-service models for primary care reform: a population-based evaluation.
CMAJ. 2009;180(11):E72–81.
31. Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care. Health Care Connect,
Program Results. 2012. Available at: http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/ms/
healthcareconnect/public/results.aspx.
32. Pomey M-P, Forest P-G, Sanmartin C, Decoster C, Clavel N, Warren E, et al.
Toward systematic reviews to understand the determinants of wait time
management success to help decision-makers and managers better
manage wait times. Implement Sci. 2013;8:61.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
